Schmidt and Cohen predict the future...

Wikileaks and the Middle East uprisings have illustrated the new challenges government’s face in controlling the impact of technology. As Schmidt and Cohen correctly conclude states will struggle to control information and individuals in the age of social networks.
In the Middle East, new connection technologies have been utilized to mobilize political opposition against despot leaders. Some Middle Eastern governments have been forced to become more open and accountable, such as Egypt and Tunisia. Yet, other governments have used these new tools to constrain opposition and become more closed and repressive. In countries such as Iran and Syria, social networking sites have been utilized by security forces to co-opt protest and search out dissidents. Indeed, there has been a struggle between those striving to promote what U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has called ‘the freedom to connect’ and those who view that freedom as inimical to their political survival.

Again Schmidt and Cohen correctly conclude that new technologies and networking will clash with well-founded concerns about national security. Dealing with the Wikileak’s releases has posed a particular challenge to America’s precarious balance of transparency v security. What the U.S. government considers secret has risen 75%, from 105,163 in 1996 to 183,224 in 2009, according to the U.S. Information Security Oversight Office However, instead holding “tightly to freedom and openness" as Schmidt and Cohen suggest, the U.S. will likely choose its unprecedented classifications. Meanwhile, Bradley Manning sits in isolation in a Kansas prison, awaiting trial. He face charges that could carry the death penalty for his alleged participation in the leaks.

Diplomacy reconceived...from past work...

So this week’s blog was optional. I decided to post part of my lit review for a paper I wrote on the Office of eDiplomacy last semester as it is all about the topic of diplomacy being reconceived.

The Obama administration has made Government 2.0 initiative a priority. There are numerous articles on the possibilities and dangers of using collaborative tools in the government, especially in sensitive areas such as security and diplomacy. Because of the increased transparency and possibility for leaks, some fear that these new policies will create security risks.

NY Times columnist Jesse Lichtenstein’s profile on State Department employees’ Alec Ross and Jared Cohen in July 2010 references three scholars who highlight the controversy in the shifts in diplomatic practice. Evgeny Morozov at Georgetown is a critic of 21^st Century Statecraft diplomacy. He sees how autocratic governments can use social media tools to control and repress populations. Scholar Anne-Marie Slaughter, (was until recently) Director of Policy Planning at State, asserts that we are already in a networked world, and we must measure power through our levels of connectedness. Another scholar, Clay Shirky at New York University, articulates that, “The loss of control you fear is already in the past. You do not actually control the message, and if you believe you control the message, it merely means you no longer understand what is going on.”[1]

Two articles in the November 2010 edition of Foreign Affairs magazine further the debate. Secretary Hillary Clinton calls for an emphasis on civilian power through a redefinition of diplomacy and development. She makes a case for more coordination between the State Department and US AID in order to achieve development work that is sustainable and long-term. Her vision, announced as Civil Society 2.0 in November 2009, gives foreign service officers more responsibility to reach out to not only other governments, but also to the private sector and civil society.[2]

Google CEO Eric Schmidt and new to Google from the State Department Jared Cohen, co-authored “The Digital Disruption: Connectivity and the Diffusion of Power.” They assert that beyond the nation-state efforts of defense, diplomacy and development, the most useful tools for citizens are created by the private sector in terms of hardware and software. They reference previous debates on what is most useful in development projects, such as whether modernization approaches coming from governments are effective. They argue that while governments and the private sector will continue to be the most influential, that if these powers don’t consider civilians and NGOs, efforts at development and diplomacy will fail. They acknowledge historical debates about communications technologies and the inherent security risks and potential benefits in any new technology. They also see how technology can act as a disintermediation tool in terms of opposition groups getting their messages out. Their underlying message is that progress can only be made when all groups are taken into consideration.[3]

In the October 2010 Foreign Service magazine, Marc Grossman wrote an article called “Speaking Out: Defining the Ideal Diplomat”. He was a Foreign Service officer from 1976-2005, with his last post as Under Secretary of Political Affairs from 2001-2005. He believes that new employees must have training that includes a “respect for the history of American diplomacy, a focus on leadership and accountability, guidance on how to link policy and resources, skill at program direction, and readiness to use new media.”[4] He also spells out that “Today’s diplomats must be able to work effectively with the interagency community, as well as overseas counterparts, nongovernmental organizations and the private sector.”[5] His article reflects a larger trend present in not only government agencies, but also other agencies working on development projects. One of these trends is the increasing focus on multistakeholderism, where government agencies work with non-governmental agencies (NGOs), the private sector, and citizens to achieve their goals.[6]

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[1] Lichtenstein, “Digital Diplomacy - NYTimes.com,” 4.

[2] Clinton, “Leading through Civilian Power: Redefining American Diplomacy and Development,” 15.

[3] Schmidt and Cohen, “The Digital Disruption: Connectivity and the Diffusion on Power.”

[4] Grossman, “Speaking Out: Defining the Ideal Diplomat,” 13.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Levinson, “Class Lecture I.”

Another One Bites the Dust: America.gov, We Hardly Knew You

While at the State Department last summer, I heard quite a bit about America.gov, the Web site begun at the tail end of Condoleezza Rice's tenure as Secretary of State as a multi-language home base for the United States' public diplomacy efforts. So I was surprised to see this short article stating that America.gov, as of March 31st, no longer exists, as State has abandoned ship and is "refocusing" their resources on Facebook and Twitter, which they call "push" efforts.

Honestly, I am not sure how I feel about this move. On the one hand, yes, Facebook and Twitter are great ways to connect with people all over the world. Absolutely. On the other hand, I can't help but think of Malcolm Gladwell's article, "Small Change," that we read earlier this semester, which takes a skeptical view of the power of social networking sites to effect meaningful political and social change because of their non-hierarchical structure. As he says, "Facebook and the like are tools for building networks, which are the opposite, in structure and character, of hierarchies. Unlike hierarchies, with their rules and procedures, networks aren't controlled by a single central authority."

I certainly understand why State wants to utilize Facebook and Twitter more than they have, especially in terms of individual embassies' and consulates' presence. But I'm not sure they should be totally abandoning the America.gov model either. It looked more official, more like it was coming from somewhere important. And State saw that as a bad thing, I guess. This despite the fact that Secretary Clinton, in the article we read last week, said that "public diplomacy must start at the top." While the directives to use social media do come from that top, I still think the United States needs a central Web site where all of its current information about public diplomacy initiatives is in one place. And I fear that all this jumping on the Facebook and Twitter bandwagon could ultimately have underwhelming results. The "weak ties" that these networks engender, while they may increase "resilience and adaptability," may not be as effective in the long run as more structured platforms like a formal Web site. It's a toss-up, though. Since I can't look at the Web site anymore, I can't say whether it was attractive, well-organized, or full of worthwhile content. If not, then maybe moving to Facebook and Twitter exclusively wasn't a totally bad idea--but why not try to revamp the Web site instead of abandoning the format entirely? This example shows how much work still needs to be done to make real strides in America's public diplomacy strategy.

It's All About the Strategy!

Zahara asks if US public diplomacy should focus on telling its story or building relationships. Is this even a real question? There are plenty of stories to tell, from wiping out the Native Americans to the War in Iraq –most of which would probably not help us create trusting relationships with the countries of the world. How to build relationships should be the focus of US PD efforts; however, in order to do this we must gain more credibility from foreign audiences and show that we actually want to help someone other than ourselves. The PD focus of countries such as China and Cuba is on developmental, medical and educational aid in developing countries; and while the US is the number one country that gives humanitarian aid, these efforts are not as efficient and publicized. In my opinion, US PD should focus more on listening to the issues of other countries and responding with action.

Zahara argues however, that even with a basis on relationship building, strategies would still be ineffective as a result of not fully understanding “the overarching strategy or grand strategy that conditions both strategy and tactics” (157). More professionals in the field of communication should be included in policy decision making so that this idea of grand strategy is not overlooked. Botan outlines four grand strategies: the intransigent, resistant, cooperative and integrative (157-159). I find this idea very interesting and useful, and like Zahara, agree that implementing any of these strategies is still pointless if the environment hasn’t been analyzed to gauge which strategy can be most effective. One would think that the importance of having a strategy would be the first step to implementing pd to foreign audiences, however it would appear that this has not been the case. While US PD reports that two way communication and listening are what is most important, communications theory is not truly being analyzed or implemented to reach these goals.

In order to do more than just ‘tell our story,’ the US government must recognize the importance of cross-cultural and communications research to include in PD efforts and implement them with a clear strategy in mind. It is hard to estimate the result of a PD initiative; however, the US is capable of doing a much better job gaining credibility by first taking these steps.

Source:

R.S. Zahara “Grand Strategy: From Battles to Bridges” in Battles to Bridges: US Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy after 9/11 (2010)

Does US Smart Power Exists

I was very inspired reading after Hilary Rodham Clintons Leading Through Civilian Power Subtitle: Redefining American Diplomacy and Development. Clinton talked about the “smart power” approach, which is needed to help solve global problems and for the US to find a balance between hard and soft power.

Clinton states, “We must not only rebuild—but also rethink, reform, and recalibrate.” This notion I believe is vital! I think the US, as well as other nations, have very big problems with change. Just like people, governments get in the habits of certain ways to do things and have tribulations to co-evolve with the developments of the time. The world is changing, relationships are changing, problems are changing…. So the US must change their means of diplomacy and development. We do see the US doing this, but not at a fast enough pace.

This is not to say that the US cannot still use traditional forms of diplomacy which Clinton notes will remain critical to advance the US agenda; but like Clinton affirms, “it is not enough.” I agree that people must work together, and engagement must go beyond just governments; we must also leverage power by creating connections. Everything that Clinton is saying I agree with, so is she following through? Are these changes being made?

One of her points that hit very close to home was the notion that “although the world’s problems are vast, the United States’ resources are not.” The US must take advantage of creating partnerships. However, this seems to be very hard for the US. For example, with the current partnership of nations involved in helping rebel forces in Libya, the US continues to be bombarded that they are not doing enough, that they have the power to take the lead, so why are they not taking it?

Playing Follow the Leader

Japan is of particular significance to our group's case study of South Korea's Public Diplomacy. Relations between Japan and Korea have been strained in the past, due to their colonial history. Nonetheless, Korea has had trouble promoting awareness and improving its image abroad, and has looked to the success of Japan as a model. As a result, Korea has adopted some of the same public diplomacy tactics as kind of a roadmap for gaining international recognition, and incidentally, along the way relations between the two have improved.

Tadashi Ogawa's chapter on the Origin and Development of Japan's Public Diplomacy highlights several aspects of Japanese public diplomacy which I noticed were mirrored by some of Korea's recent initiatives. In 2004, Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) was reformed to include culture more strategically as a public diplomacy resource. This led to the incorporation of public relations and cultural exchange into a newly established Public Diplomacy Department (PDD). Similarly, Korea established the Presidential Council on Nation Branding (PCNB) in January 2009. It also takes a public relations market approach to improving Korea's image, and has focused on advancing policies aimed at promoting the country’s culture and history worldwide.

Ogawa points out that a weakness of the Japanese approach is that there is no inter-ministerial coordination system within the Japanese government to discuss overall public diplomacy strategies or advise on resource allocation, performance, management, and evaluation. Korea has the same problem of a lack of cohesion around its PD efforts which have resulted in weak branding campaigns that have fallen flat.

A more successful aspect of Japanese strategy that Korea is trying to recreate is leveraging the success of pop-culture abroad. Similar to the J-Pop phenomenon, K-Pop first took off as a market phenomenon where cultural products gained popularity with global consumers. Recognizing the potential to wield soft power from the K-wave, (aka Hallyu), as Japan did with the J-wave, the Korean government has started subsidizing firms that promote Korean culture abroad, and allocating funding for production of new cultural and media products. In Japan part of the mass appeal of cultural products can be attributed to the "odorless" nature of exports like anime and manga, which Allison describes in Attractions of the J Wave. To quell animosity and perceptions of cultural hegemony in neighboring Asian countries, Korea has adopted a similar strategy for its pop-culture productions, favoring a more pan-Asian image.

2002 was a year where Japan and Korea united their PD efforts directed at the world as well as each other. They co-hosted the FIFA World Cup, and the Presidents agreed to designate 2002 as the Year of Japan-ROK National Exchange and to promote exchange in fields such as culture, sports, youth, regional exchange, and tourism. Ogawa notes how the Japanese perception of Korea was dramatically improved and, going forward relations between the two have been stable, thanks in large part to numerous people-to-people exchanges.

Japan: Four points

Point one: Maybe some overlap and less centralization is good for PD

Reading the article by Tadashi Ogawa on the history of Japan’s PD made me wonder if it is better to have PD programs and structures more loosely organized. He looks at how after WWII, Japan’s PD was based on the British model, where the different actors involved in creating and running programs did not have a centralized organizing body. It made me think that while I think it is good to not duplicate efforts, maybe overlaps can be positive, as long as the different organizers don’t feel threatened when those overlaps occur and can instead build off of each other. Also, sometimes smaller efforts that don’t have to go through chains of command can be more effective and connected to specific locations.

Point two: My Japan unit in 4^th grade

My elementary school in NH (not a bastion of diversity) had a country or focus for each grade to study (Russia in 3^rd, Medieval Europe in 5^th). In 4^th grade we had an elaborate Japanese festival, where each of us learned cultural and artistic skills that we then shared. I was in charge of an origami table, and then ran a tea ceremony. Other kids learned flower arranging (one of our classmates was Japanese and his mother came in to help teach us). We learned some words in Japanese and other parts of Japan’s history. I am wondering now if this program was part of the program in the 1980s by the Department of Cultural Exchange to promote more cultural exchange. It certainly made an impression on me at age 9 and made me want to go there.

Point three: Odorlessness

We have talked about how the success of Japanese anime is due in part to it not being traceable back to its country/culture of origin. The class discussion brought up that if a product is odorless, than how can it be used as a PD program? But, if the point is to take the Cull approach to a PD where the origin of a program no longer matters, than maybe odorlessness is in fact key to PD. Because then the message may get through without needing the messanger as the focus.

Point four: PD as reciprocity

I was intrigued to learn about how Japan has had PD programs which are also about educating Japanese people about other Asian cultures. Perhaps the US could learn from this. We could certainly use a bit more education internally about “otherness”. The history of why PD in the US is separated from domestic programs made some sense when the government and media were able to gatekeep information. But with the international flows of media, it would make more sense for the US to embrace PD as not about messaging differently to domestic and overseas audiences. Instead, what if the US were to also think about the reciprocity of internal PD as a way to build bridges? It seems like in Japan, this approach has helped to educate Japanese people about other cultures, and created ties between people from Japan and other countries.

Pop Culture PD

When you’re a country with great food, creative fashion, the newest technology, popular product brands, and anime… how do you focus public diplomacy efforts?? Do you focus them on these cultural and popular aspects at all? With so many possible angles, how does the Japan Foundation and Ministry of Foreign Affairs decide which ones to take? While clout has definitely been attained through the popularity of Japanese fashion and pop culture, I do not agree that pd efforts should be focused on these aspects of their culture.

Upon hearing the word Japan, I’d think that they’d feel better knowing that people’s first thoughts are of economic and technological success, not Pokemon and Hello Kitty. Then again, with such an interesting pop culture that caters to people of all ages, it is almost as if they have a step up on the rest of the world. Foreign audiences are almost conditioned to like and be interested in Japan if they grew up watching anime, reading comics or taking karate classes. Having put it in that perspective, perhaps it is not a bad thing to have a plethora of ways to gain soft power via cultural exportation.

Moreover, it may be that these cultural aspects translate into place branding moreso than public diplomacy. If pop culture gets people interested in your country and wanting to learn more about it, that doesn’t directly transform into solidarity or soft power. And again the burning question becomes, ‘well, what really is pd then?’…. perhaps the world will never know…

Can Popular Culture Overcome Old Animosities?

I think it is extremely interesting that Japan jumped on the bandwagon of using the value of their popular culture as a tool for their foreign policy. They believe that the impact of their culture is shaping their regions cultural markets, but I still question how much of an impact it actually has in their influence over the region and the rest of the world just like Nissim Kadosh Otmazgin in Contesting soft power: Japanese popular culture in East and Southeast Asia.

Even though “the export of Japan’s consumer goods has been swiftly changing the country’s image overseas in the last two decades, manifesting the country’s economic might,” I agree with Otmazgin that soft power does have limitations (78, 77). I think soft power using cultural products has a limit and depends on the audience being targeted.

Im curious if Japans cultural products can ever overcome the old animosities of Japans Wartime conduct in East Asia. For example, China and Japan have had many different historical encounters. One can look at all the issues that arise with the war crimes by the Japanese in Nangin in 1937 which some note as the “Forgotten Holocaust of World War II,” and that the Japanese government continues to deny its part in the massacre. Can cultural products/culture overcome these issues? I think the cultural products can make a difference but they also must be joined by other public diplomacy efforts. I don’t think popular culture alone can help foreign policy/relations between places like Japan and China. It can be a part of it, but it can be the only means.

"Nuclear Samurai"

In the wake of the Japanese earthquake, tsunami and nuclear crisis the repetitive message resounding in the news has been the incredibly stoic response of its citizens. The BBC, Reuters, the National Post for example have applauded the Japanese people’s “sense of duty, the bravery and endurance”. While the world has watched Japan struggle with containing these three successive disasters, many references has been made to Japanese history of stoicism, including samurai and agrarian communal lifestyles.
In the readings for this week, specific mention is made to East Asian resentment towards Japanese history. The legacy of the Second World War, historical animosity, and political rivalries has led to a distrust of Japan in East Asia. Thus, Japan has had to try to transcend these obstacles in its attempts to export its culture abroad. However, the horrors that Japan has recently been forced to endure, has led to a myriad of positive media stories about the strength and honor of Japanese culture, which Japan could use to its advantage.
These tragedies have depicted the Japanese “stoicism” in a positive light, as opposed to the well know kamikaze pilots of WWII for example. Likewise, the historical slate may be wiped cleaner by focusing on Japan’s response to this nuclear crisis, as opposed to the causes of Japan’s last nuclear disaster. These stories overcome the tint of self serving, traditional, public relations strategies, and are perpetuated by foreign new agencies abroad. The tragedies that have befallen Japan are horrific, but the gold lining could be the reframing of Japanese stoicism, in terms of endurance and humility, as opposed to arrogance and imperialism. We have watch and empathized with Japan’s struggles, and we just may never view Japan the same.

Joseph Nye on China: Straight from the horse’s mouth…

I don’t know about you, but I find that learning can sometimes be much easier when a teacher simply presents me with their theory, as opposed to reading their theory independently. That’s why I was happily surprised to find Joseph Nye’s lecture on Global Power Shifts on Ted.com. In this brief lecture Nye, not only sets out his theory on oft power in the 21st century, he also addresses the “raise of China.” Nye acknowledges two new shifts in power: (1) what he calls the “resifting of Power from West to East” and (2) power shifting from State to Non-State actors (the new free flow of information allows for the dissemination of many messages, thus the state’s power is largely diffused.
Nye defines power as the ability to affect others to get the outcome that you want, which can be accomplished through the stick (through threats/coercion), the carrot (incentives), and soft power (getting others to want what you want). Meaning, the new power, isn’t whose army wins, but whose story wins. Which is all things we have discussed in class, but helpful to hear directly from the designer.
Regarding the “rise of china and decline of the US,” Nye warns that focusing on solely economic power, doesn’t say anything about China’s soft power. Similar to what we read in Soft Power in Chinese Discourse, Nye also asserts that China’s soft power strategies has not been effective with its neighbors, who remain largely hostile, and prefer America’s soft power. In reading Soft Power in Chinese Discourse, I get the impression that China’s failings in Soft Power stem, at least in part, from their emphasis on “culture being the main source of soft power.”
Nye closes by asserting that soft power will be even more important in this century as our increasingly connected world will require compromise. As opposed to simply exporting the value of their cultures, States need to combine both hard and soft power, into strategies of smart power, which Nye defined as win-win strategies. China has stronger soft power in Latin American and Africa, where it has invested in mutually beneficial strategies, and this will be the winning power strategy of the 21 century.

China and soft power

Last semester, I did a group project on China and the media coverage of the Nobel Prize Winner, Liu Xiaobo. I started reading through all the Chinese English press and read about 20 articles that all mentioned soft power, Nye, and how to increase China’s soft power. I’m not really sure what this achieves because it doesn’t seem like the appropriate place to talk about soft power. It feels self-conscious and misplaced. Mingjiang Li’s article, “Soft Power in Chinese Discourse: Popularity and Prospect” gives a comprehensive overview of the number of articles and official documents that mention soft power, but points out that there is not one agreed upon definition or consensus about what it means or how to go about achieving it.

In reading Yiwei Wang’s 2008 article, “Public Diplomacy and the Rise of Chinese Soft Power”, there are several important points that highlight why maybe China is not achieving its PD goals. Wang looks at how some of the ways words and concepts are translated create misunderstanding. For example, he points out that in China, external and internal propaganda are not seen as separate. In addition, propaganda as a concept doesn’t have the same negative implications as it does for a US audience. However, I think that having any kind of targeting messaging, whether internal or external suffers credibility as most will be able discern unbalanced presentations of information.

Another important point in his article is that “traditional Chinese diplomacy emphasizes high politics and neglects grassroots politics.”(p. 260). With all the shifts in terms of governance structures, this weakens the ability of China to reach the publics it may need to communicate with in order to achieve its objectives.

In his discussion on the meaning of power in China, he distinguishes the Chinese meaning of power as related more to morality, in contrast to what he says power means in the west where the power subject controls the power subject. He articulates that in China, power come from morality, which stems from nature. However, in terms of PD, a lot of people in the West don’t see China’s power as based in morality. For example, many people in the US look at Chinese policy in Tibet as oppressive. Again, actions speak more than words.

So, while Li points out that China’s philosophy is about relativity and diversity, these philosophies don’t come through when Nobel Peace Prize winners are in jail and the internet is censored.

China's Soft Power Initiative in the Developing World

The trend as of late seems to be that American’s are scared of the rise of China as an economic force to be reckoned with. According to Esther Pan, “US and European soft-power efforts are focused on democracy promotion and encouraging good governance abroad, while China’s engagement involves lucrative trade and energy deals and produces tangible results like newly-built roads, hospitals and schools.” Like other countries that are isolated from full participation in the Western world, Cuba for example, China focuses its public diplomacy efforts on developing nations in an attempt to gain the hearts and minds of populations that not unlike themselves are struggling to gain a place of prominence in a Western dominated world. In Africa, China has implemented a variety of programs in an effort to create solidarity and gain soft power. According to CFR senior fellow for Africa policy studies, Princeton Lyman, this soft-power engagement in Africa includes the following:

-professing solidarity with Africa in international forums on trade and human rights issues

-forgiving more that $1 billion in debt from African countries

-training more than 100,000 Africans in Chinese universities and military institutions

-Sending more than 900 doctors to work across Africa; and

-making major investments in infrastructure, agriculture, and energy

Apparently China isn’t just talking about relationships, they are actively working to create them. By getting their hands dirty and providing the actual needs of the African people, they are much more likely to gain soft power and positive public opinion than let’s say, US initiatives focusing on democracy and regime change, etc. African leaders are beginning to intensify their relations with China, seeing that the country has been able to grow economically without changing its government. As China’s soft-power increases throughout the developing world however, the country still faces many internal issues that must be addressed before it can truly be seen as a player on the field for international domination.

Source: Esther Pan, “China’s Soft Power Initiative,” Council on Foreign Affairs. http://www.cfr.org/china/chinas-soft-power-initiative/p10715#p7

Is Chinese Aid a form of Soft Power?

There is no question over Chinas embracing of public diplomacy and soft power specifically. As a rapidly developing country, they are resource dependent and their image and then relationship with other countries is extremely important.

Therefore, I’m curious if aid can be considered a source soft power. Rising donor China interrupted the Wests’ game plan in the developing world. China has engaged not only within Asia but has sought after Africa as well as Latin America. China became a new alternative for developing countries instead of always turning to the west.

Chinas opening of its doors and economic rise lead them to be the worlds second-largest economy, has allowed for China to interact within the developing world and challenge so called “donor actions”. China has become a new source of finance in developing countries especially those in Africa.

And just like any other donor nations, Chinas engagement in Africa and other developing countries has been condemned by some and looked up to by others. Leaders of developing nations like those in Africa were almost uniformly positive about the benefits of Chinas embrace. For example, the Zambian President has noted that the Chinese government has brought a lot of development to their countries. Chinese aid and economic cooperation programs emphasized mutual benefit.

In my opinion, aid does seem like a form of soft power. One of the problems noted by Yiwei Wang in Public Diplomacy and the Rise of Chinese Soft Power, is that Chinese culture is too specific to be understood correctly by foreigners , hence aid (money) could be argued to be understood by all(258). Thoughts??

Place branding and control vs management

What’s your brand? Do you have an online identity that is different from your in-person character? How do you control how other people view YOU? What does this mean for you? What about celebrities? Who creates their images and do they have a stake in controlling their brand? From the level of individual and on up into organizations, identity is something that we grapple with. Part of our identity is formed from our perceptions of how other people view us. Even when we get old enough to realize we are not each the center of the universe for anyone but ourselves, we try to control our image.

It’s the way we dress, our hairstyles, language(s) we use, our body language, our daily choices, how we treat other people, the vision we have for ourselves. How does this get projected into the creation of national images and national brands? All organizations and nations are made up of individuals contending with identity and image challenges, which go into the daily tasks and decision-making processes we do/make as individuals and groups. I think that part of this process is realizing that we can’t control people’s perceptions of ourselves. I think manage is a better way to conceptualize it.

In his chapter on place branding, van Ham argues that branding "is not only about 'selling' products, services, ideas and foreign policies, it is not only about gaining market share and attention, it is also all about managing identity, loyalty, and reputation." (van Ham, p. 141).

Anholt, in “The Importance of National Reputation”, argues that national reputations are fairly stable. He also says that “National reputation truly cannot be constructed; it can only be earned.” (Anholt, p. 34)

So while we may try to manage reputations (national, corporate, individual), construction is not enough. There has to be a foundation for the construction that is based on reality of actions, product quality, and personability.

Anholt outlines his “competitive identity” concept, which includes components for creating influence-- brands, tourism, people, policy, investment and culture. This brings me to the point discussed in class, where place branding and Public Diplomacy can be different, overlap, join each other, or be treated in the same way- depending on how they are defined. Our guest speaker, Efe believes that place branding is the creation of meaning, and public diplomacy is just a communication tool.

But I don’t see such a distinct separation between creation of meaning and communication. Maybe he meant the thought that goes behind the management of place branding as where the meaning is created and then that the PD is the actual implementation to strive toward that image. As discussed, even if you don’t put effort into creating your image, you will have an image. Maybe it means there is a shift from policy as the driving force behind PD toward a broader goals of an essence or idea inherent in a place branding conceptualization that is bigger than policy goals.

My takeaways

1.distinctions between place branding and PD are contextual and therefore in scholarship and conversation, definitions have to be outlined for common ground/understanding to occur.

2. management is more realistic than control because you can not control how an audience will receive your message.

Can a Stained Reputation be Dry-Cleaned?

Simon Anholt makes a distinction between having a brand, what I would call reputation, and the ability to be branded. He is skeptical of nation-branding tactics in particular, because he does not equate countries to the kind of consumer products that benefit from marketing style branding campaigns. On this, he says politicians are misguided in thinking that branding a country can have the same effect as when "companies manage to shape public discourse, manipulate their own images at will, and inspire unwavering respect, loyalty, even love for their brands."

So, to the question of whether a country's stained reputation could be "dry-cleaned," that is washed away clean again by PR tactics, Anholt would say no. He sees a country's reputation as fixed; something that cannot be constructed and can only be earned. He even quotes Socrates to make the point that brand and image are no more than a reflection of reality:

"The way to achieve a better reputation is to endeavour to be what you desire to appear"

While I agree that a positive image is often the result of a person or country's positive attributes speaking for themselves, I am less skeptical of nation-branding than Anholt, and do think there is a place for it in shaping public perception. No, a reputation cannot be constructed or fabricated, the qualities to be touted must actually exist. However, countries, like people, are subject to misperception, misinterpretation, and obscurity. This is where I think nation-branding fits in. Assuming brand is reputation, then I see nation-branding as the attempt to redefine the brand, according to those qualities and accomplishments for which the country wants to be known. In a case of semantics, Anholt makes the same point, but prefers describe it as managing "competitive identity." In this framework, public diplomacy then would be the act of accelerating global awareness of the nation-brand through communications.

Place Branding or Tourism?

As made clear by Efe Sevin, our guest speaker in class this week, place branding is distinct from public diplomacy. However, is it any different from tourism?? If place branding deals with the image and reputation of a given place is this not just the work of a country’s Ministry of Tourism or like institution? If consulting customers are most likely to be small cities and chambers of commerce, it would seem to me that place branding is about giving a particular location meaning –creating the perception that this is a place that you should want to visit. In this case, what is it good for?

Public diplomacy is about creating relationships between governments and/or foreign audiences; therefore creating solidarity and gaining trust and worldwide support. Place branding seems to be more geared to the commerce of a location- a way to advertise so that the locale gets more visitors and in turn more money through fresh waves of tourism and spending. Perhaps branding is more significant for tourism and investment than necessarily a competition for hearts and minds. Foreign audiences may enjoy traveling to your country and enjoying the sites and foods; but if they don’t agree with the policies and actions being taken by the government, there is still plenty of room for discontent with the country. Simon Anholt notes that place branding only happens when the infrastructure of a country is changed… perhaps this is the missing link that is necessary for making place branding more than an effort to boost tourism.

A (Wine) Drop in the Bucket for Moldova's Nation Branding

While trolling the Internet for job postings today (let's be honest, it takes up a lot of my time these days with graduation about a month away), I was intrigued by the description of a project directed by development consulting firm Chemonics. The project has helped a winery in Moldova successfully brand itself and build a consumer base in the UK market. Moldova is another one of the countries I dealt with in my office at State last summer, so I'm always interested and glad to see their successes. As a result of this project and the help of USAID, Acorex Wineholding was able to break into both the UK and German markets by enlisting the help of a wine brand design firm. This firm in turn helped them develop a unique brand identity, headlined by its new slogan, "Taking Root."

This small-scale project got me thinking about how branding, and more specifically ideas of nation branding, can be used in a development context, and how it related to our discussion of Simon Anholt's work on place branding last week. As Anholt states in his introduction, "...the reputations of countries are analogous to the brand images of companies and products, and are equally critical to the progress and prosperity of those countries..." While Moldova has a long way to go in terms of basics to stability, like a market economy, consistent rule of law, and infrastructure improvements, I think this project--as seemingly insignificant as it may seem at first glance--is a very good first step to establishing itself as a nation that is capable of doing successful nation branding in the future. It creates attention and interest about Moldova--which wants eventually to join the EU--in the UK and Germany, both countries with vast public diplomacy and branding strategy experience, to Moldova's potential--as an eventual tourist destination for wine connoisseurs, for example, or as a viable import-export partner. Chemonics' role in facilitating this partnership should not be overlooked either--it goes back to our discussion last week of the need for more public-private collaboration on the path to successful public diplomacy. In short, this small project is a great example of how nation branding and development can go hand in hand, especially in a strategically important region like Europe.

U.S. and the Libyan public:

Simon Anholt’s “The Importance of National Reputation” asserts that “the days of diplomacy as a means just of delivering narrow national self-interest are gone.” In today’s world the public has become a vital player in international policy. Nowhere is this shift in power from the elites to the public more clearly seen, than in the Middle East today.

Recently leaked documents have provided a unique insight into how the U.S. government utilized diplomacy and what when knew about the Middle Eastern countries which are now enflamed with uprisings. The American embassy in Libya was reopened in 2004. Yet, the Government of Libya sought to prevent U.S. embassy workers from traveling in-country and engaging with Libyans. The Libyan government “actively enforced” new strictures to prevent diplomats from traveling outside Tripoli. And diplomat’s attempts to engage with the Libyan minority communities were condemned as "unacceptable interference" in Libya's domestic affairs.

The Libyan government justified the measures on security grounds; however, it appeared to be largely motivated by a desire to circumscribe reporting on internal political issues and to specifically target U.S. diplomats. Given that the regime's other recent measures on sensitive bilateral issues appeared to have been authored at the highest levels of the Libyan government, embassy workers concluded that engagement by senior officials in Washington with their governmental interlocutors would be necessary to mitigate the constraints on their ability to conduct in-country travel and engagement with Libyan.

Despite comments by senior Libyan officials attesting to the desire for broader and deeper ties with the U.S., significant elements of the regime, particularly within the security apparatus, remained deeply skeptical of U.S.-Libya bilateral re-engagement in general, and of embassy workers’ travel and outreach in particular. Not much has been released about the Libyan government, as it maintained an expansive definition of "unacceptable interference" in its domestic affairs. Security organizations regard any effort to engage with Libyans and to report on domestic issues as dangerously subversive, reflecting the regime's overweening focus on pre-empting any potential challenge to its authority, particularly from U.S. diplomats.
It appears that the U.S. government is aware of the need to engage both small groups of particularly influential individuals as well as the general public. However, our government’s ability to reach out to the public and work with them to develop and implement international policy solutions is dependent to a large amount on what that government allows.

Anholt: Genius or Phony

Even though there are many proponents of nation branding , there are also those that are in opposition of this growing trend. Even Simon Anholt, who coined the phrase “nation branding” does not like the impact of the term. Anholt states is his newest book, Places: Identity, Image and Reputation, “there is no such thing as ‘nation branding.’”[1] He does not like how branding has been used to make people think of superficial marketing tips. Even though he notes that places continually compete with each other in the global market place and that nations do have brands, just like they have reputations, Anholt states, “those reputations are every bit as important to their progress and prosperity in the modern world as brand images are to corporations and their products.”[2]

In Public Diplomacy: Place Branding Week, Anholt also notes how hard it can be to not conform to the national stereotype(32). Simon Anholt asserts that there is evidence to suggest that “there is no detectable correlation between changes in national image and expenditure on ‘national branding campaigns.”[3] Nation branding campaigns are also effective in creating awareness to a target audience; yet the power to alter another’s opinion and their behavior about a country is very different.[4] All around the world marketing campaigns are sold to governments or leading bodies of countries, cities, regions, and other destinations, and according to Anholt, “billions of dollars of public money are spent producing them and placing them in the media, where they disappear without a trace.” [5] Anholt concludes that he believes that nation branding is the problem, not the solution.

Just like Efe Sevin noted in our Class, I find Anholt confusing and contradicting. He seems to be afraid to make specific claims and state specific definitions, and instead keeps everything very broad. Sevin notes how Anholt believes that place branding only works through the changing of the actual nation structure and that in his eyes, the nations brand is what would be remembered if, say, it dissolved. I’m still pondering that opinion and at this point don’t know whether I agree or disagree. What do you all think?

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[1] Simon Anholt. Places: Identity, Image and Reputation. New York: Pelgrave Macmillan, 2010. 1

[2] Simon Anholt. Places: Identity, Image and Reputation. 2

[3] Simon Anholt. Places: Identity, Image and Reputation. 2

[4] Simon Anholt. Places: Identity, Image and Reputation. 3

[5] Simon Anholt. Places: Identity, Image and Reputation. 3